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n all likelihood, the European Commission’s proposed tax on financial services, the financial 
transaction tax (FTT), will raise sizeable tax revenues, which explains its political appeal in the 
current context. However, the tax fails to address the key factors that contributed to the global 
financial crisis. Short of global or even EU-wide cooperation, many of the transactions subject to a tax 
will relocate to non-cooperating countries, thereby reducing revenue prospects and the effectiveness of 
supervision. Moreover, the proposal fails to address the growth of leverage, systemic risks, or the moral 
hazard risks arising from ‘too-big-to-fail’ or ‘too-systemic-to-fail’ institutions. Even if it becomes a 
reality, the proposal should not undermine the chances of more meaningful tax policy alternatives 
being implemented in the future.  
After many months of waiting, the European Commission has finally revealed its preferred 
method for taxing the financial services industry. To the surprise of many, the measure 
comes in the form of a financial transaction tax (FTT). The published text proposes a tax of 
0.1% on security trades and a 0.01% tax on all derivatives transactions, potentially bringing 
in substantial revenues.1 The impact assessment accompanying the proposal suggests that it 
will lead to a massive relocation and ‘disappearance’ of activities and substantial hikes in the 
cost of capital, resulting in a reduction of l o n g - r u n  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  E U  b y  a n  
estimated 1.8%.  
Traditionally, the key aim of a financial transaction tax is to discourage speculative trading. 
James Tobin, the godfather of the measure, promoted the tax as a way to “throw sand in the 
wheels of international finance”, aiming to impose transaction costs for short-term currency 
trading to prevent excessive volatility and speculative attacks on currency (Eichengreen et 
al., 1995). In the present context of a looming sovereign debt tragedy, the tax has also become 
popular due to its revenue potential. According to the Commission’s own arithmetic, the 
proposed FTT can raise anything between €25 billion to €45 billion per year. Whether it will 
achieve these aims is highly dependent on the plausibility of the Commission’s underlying 
assumptions on avoidance and relocations. The probability of it being the best fiscal response 
among the existing potential policy options is even more questionable. 
 
                                                      
1 For more details, see the European Commission’s website on the financial transaction tax 
(http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm).  
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As recently as this spring, the FTT did not appear to be the number one choice among the list 
of tax policy alternatives at hand. Instead, the focus appeared to be more on the financial 
activity tax (FAT), which would tax ‘supra-normal’ profits and remuneration. The 
application of the third alternative, the financial stability contribution (FSC) and its variants, 
which would tax un-insured liabilities (excluding equity), has been left to the member states.  
The Commission’s initial preference for the FAT over the FTT was mostly in line with the 
guidance provided by the IMF's reports on taxing financial services, published in 2010.2 
Having considered the three tax alternatives, the reports argued that the FTT would fail to 
address the “core sources of financial instability”, would be easily avoidable, and passed on 
to final consumers. The reports also provided evidence from Swedish and UK experience 
that suggests that transaction taxes tend to lower market liquidity – and not always the bad 
kind –  and increase short-term volatility.  
So, why did the Commission shift its focus suddenly? The reason appears to be political. 
Over the past few years, the measure has gained support in some member states, such as 
France and Germany, while being vehemently opposed by others, such as the UK. The 
Commission was given a green light to prepare an assessment by the European Parliament 
this March. Moreover, the concept of a transaction tax is simple and reflects a sense of equity, 
given that most household transactions are subject to a tax while financial transactions tend 
to be untaxed.3 To cap it all, as highlighted by Mr. Barroso, there is a sense that the moment 
is ripe for the “financial sector to make a contribution back to society”. In short, given the 
resistance to any form of taxation from the industry, the Commission appears to have opted 
for instant political support.  
Instead of relying solely on political or revenue-raising reasoning, the discussion should 
focus on the impact of taxes on financial stability – some of which are already highlighted in 
the Commission’s impact assessment. Whichever alternative is chosen, it should not weaken 
financial stability and ensure that taxpayers would “never again be asked to foot the bill” for 
the banks’ mistakes.4 In this regard, three lessons learnt from the crisis appear to be 
applicable.  
First, the crisis highlighted the risks of ‘too-big-to-fail’ or ‘too-systemic-to-fail’ institutions. 
Such institutions benefit from an indirect guarantee of a bail-out, which gives their 
shareholders an incentive to direct managers to take on more risk. To a large extent, this 
particular form of moral hazard emanates from the facts that i) the public authorities have 
the ability (i.e. fiscal space) and the motive (i.e. domestic interest) to engage in a bail-out; and 
ii) there is no credible resolution mechanism to prevent messy bankruptcy procedures. As far 
as possible, the proposed policy should contribute to a solution and not aggravate systemic 
risks.  
Second, the crisis has confirmed the belief that tougher regulations do not automatically 
enhance stability when regulatory arbitrage is an option. Relocation to less regulated 
jurisdictions or the ‘disappearance’ of certain transactions through repackaging may simply 
                                                      
2 See Claessens et al. (2010) and IMF (2010).  
3 These concerns are not entirely unfounded. In the EU, as in many other advanced nations, financial 
institutions are exempted from value-added taxation (VAT), mainly due to the difficulties involved in 
associating a price to the intermediation services they provide. The European Commission’s own 
estimates, along with other estimates in the literature (Huizinga, 2002), suggest that the exemption 
translates into an advantage of 0.15% of GDP.  
4 The words of US President Barack Obama, in signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, in July 2010.  3 | EMRAH ARBAK 
 
sweep problems under the carpet. It should not be forgotten that having the risks of global 
banks stored in off-balance sheet vehicles in offshore jurisdictions – tidily tucked away from 
the home state regulators’ reach – did not prevent the financial crisis from propagating 
globally. In short, whatever form of tax instrument is introduced, it should be relatively hard 
to avoid. 
Third, there are incentives for financial institutions – especially investment banks – to 
become over-leveraged, especially through the use of debt with short maturities. These 
activities introduce systemic externalities through increased inter-connectivity, as well as 
counterparty and propagation risks.5 Indeed, as the history of financial crises has amply 
demonstrated, speculation only becomes a problem when it is carried out with borrowed 
money, resulting in layers of promises that eventually become untenable. Many reasons have 
been put forward to explain the increased use of debt by financial institutions in recent years, 
including lax monetary policies, limited growth potential of traditional forms of funding, 
and incentives to match the volatility in asset valuations using short-term debt.6 Wherever 
possible, financial services taxes should correct – and certainly not worsen – the incentives to 
take on more leverage.  
How does the FTT fare on these three fronts? Not so well. Insofar as it can be used to 
contribute to a credible resolution mechanism, any tax can be used to tackle the moral hazard 
risks from big and systemic banks. However, the FTT will probably only be used as a 
revenue-raising tool, with no specific aims to strengthen financial stability or secure credible 
resolution mechanisms.7 The tax could also play some role in mitigating systemic risks by 
targeting derivatives transactions, which give rise to such interdependencies. Despite this 
indirect impact, the FTT misses out completely on addressing the growth of leverage or 
amending the tax preferences for debt, which are embedded in most tax systems across the 
EU.  
A globally uncoordinated FTT is also likely to aggravate tax avoidance and relocations. As 
many observers have noted, trading operations are highly mobile, especially for the larger 
institutions. For those institutions, the list of ‘safe harbours’ will be long, given the fact that 
many G-20 countries, including the US and Canada – not to mention some EU member 
states, such as the UK – reject the idea of adopting an FTT. In driving a substantial 
proportion of the transactions away, the tax is also likely to hamper the monitoring and 
enforcement capacities of the home state supervisors.  
In contrast, the other options originally on the table appear to be more appropriate responses 
to these challenges. On avoidance grounds, although the FAT liabilities can be mitigated by 
the existing profit-shifting arrangements, anti-transfer-pricing rules that are in place in many 
OECD members reduce the prevalence of such artificial transfers. The FAT could correct the 
incentives for increased risk-taking by limiting excessive earnings. In this way, the tax could 
                                                      
5 For evidence on over-leveraging in European and US investment banking, see Ayadi et al. (2011) and 
Adrian & Shin (2010), among others. 
6 For a more ample discussion of the reasons behind excessive leverage and short-term build-up in the 
financial sector, see Brunnermeier (2009), Adrian & Shin (2010), and Acharya & Viswanathan (2011), 
among others.  
7 The political support for the FTT mostly rests on its revenue-raising potential, implying that the 
receipts will most likely be diverted to a general budget or to the EU’s own sources (see the European 
Commission’s proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020, SEC(2011) 876 final, 
pp. 29-30). Therefore, unless the bank resolutions are properly addressed, the tax measures can 
actually contribute to increased fiscal space (either at the member state level or at the Community 
level) and increase the likelihood of future bail-outs, thus aggravating the moral hazard risks. WILL THE FTT ENHANCE STABILITY? | 4 
 
serve as a substitute for the value-added tax (VAT), which is not applicable to financial 
services due to inherent difficulties in charging taxes to margin-based intermediation 
services.8  
In many respects, a Financial Stability Contribution would make a more fundamental 
contribution, effectively putting a price on systemic externalities arising from reliance on 
short-term funding, which constitutes the most volatile portion of banks’ balance sheets. 9 
Taxes on uninsured liabilities are much harder to avoid provided that the tax basis is 
sufficiently broad, i.e. covering any activity that will arise from the use of offshore entities to 
offload taxable debt. The tax could also go a long way towards addressing one of the age-old 
problems in finance; namely the tax disincentive for raising capital since interest payments 
are tax-deductible while dividend payments are subject to taxation. Lastly, the FSC systems 
that are in place (or being considered) in many countries are often designed to contribute to 
the maintenance of credible resolution schemes, thereby addressing one of the key sources of 
moral hazard risk.10  
To sum up, although the FTT may have received political support, it is unlikely to 
materialise as an EU-wide measure. The proposal will at best be implemented in a subset of 
member states (under the so-called ‘enhanced cooperation’ rules). This will throw the 
proposal’s ultimate impact further into question, ensuring more flexibility in relocating and 
avoidance and diminishing the revenue expectations. The Commission’s aim may be to 
implement what is politically feasible now; however, the FTT fails to address the inherent 
weaknesses in the global financial system and should not undermine the chances of other tax 
options in the future. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 Financial institutions provide a number of intermediation services to their clients, which make it 
hard to determine the value-added for a specific service. For example, what is the cost of extending 
loans to a client? Would the deposit rate reflect the true cost of funds, given the fact that banks 
typically charge a variety of additional fees to dep o s i t o r s ?  E v e n  i f  i t  d i d ,  w h a t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
interest margin – the difference between the interest rates for loans and deposits – would be due to the 
risk premium, and not subject to taxation? These complicating issues are particularly crucial when the 
client is a business, looking to obtain a credit for VAT paid on these services. For more on the 
difficulties of and arguments for the application of VAT to the financial institutions, see Huizinga 
(2002). 
9 Many variants of the FSC exist. Among these, see Perotti & Suarez (2009) for liquidity risk charges, 
which apply taxes on short-term liabilities. According to Perotti & Suarez (2011), other forms of 
regulatory tools, such as the net stable funding, liquidity coverage or leverage requirements (as 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), need to be considered alongside such 
levies to fend off systemic externalities and the moral hazard risks arising from deposit insurance 
coverage.  
10 The European Commission has shown its preference for the construction of a resolution fund, 
without clearly defining a funding method. Imposing a levy on uninsured liabilities, effectively acting 
as a simple FSC, is identified as one of the many possible ways to build an ex-ante resolution fund, but 
this has been met with criticism, especially from the banking industry. For details, see the European 
Commission’s Communication on bank resolution funds (COM(2010) 254 final) of October 2010 and 
the Commission’s consultation on crisis management (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
consultations/docs/2011/crisis_management/consultation_overview_en.pdf).   5 | EMRAH ARBAK 
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